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Price Destabilizing Speculation
Author(s) -
Oliver Hart,
David M. Kreps
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 21.034
H-Index - 186
eISSN - 1537-534X
pISSN - 0022-3808
DOI - 10.1086/261418
Subject(s) - speculation , economics , commodity , monetary economics , microeconomics , financial economics , finance
It is sometimes asserted that rational speculative activity must result in more stable prices because speculators buy when prices are low and sell when they are high. This is incorrect. Speculators buy when the chances of price appreciation are high, selling when the chances are low. Speculative activity in an economy in which all agents are rational, have identical priors, and have access to identical information may destabilize prices, under any reasonable definition of destabilization. It takes extremely strong conditions to ensure that speculative activity (of the commodity storage variety) "stabilizes" price, even in a very weak sense.

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