Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism
Author(s) -
Dan Clawson,
Alan Neustadtl
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
american journal of sociology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.755
H-Index - 181
eISSN - 1537-5390
pISSN - 0002-9602
DOI - 10.1086/229067
Subject(s) - conservatism , ideology , politics , interlock , positive economics , state (computer science) , law and economics , public relations , proposition , political economy , action (physics) , political science , economics , accounting , sociology , law , epistemology , computer science , electrical engineering , engineering , philosophy , physics , algorithm , quantum mechanics
Two alternative corporate political strategies are identified for Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions to candidates in the 1980 congressional elections: (1) a pragmatic effort to promote a particular company's best interests and (2) an ideological effort to promote conservatism. With the use of multiple regression, this article examines three theoretical explanations of corporate political strategies. The expectations of corporate liberal theory are not confirmed. Rather, there is support for both state structure and interlock theories. It is argued that, at least in 1980, business political behavior was ideologically conservative, which business understood to represent classwide rational interests.
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