Open AccessGame theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games
Author(s) -
Kevin McCabe,
Stephen Rassenti,
Ver L. Smith
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.011
H-Index - 771
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.93.23.13421
Subject(s) - reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , mathematical economics , repeated game , stochastic game , normal form game , extensive form game , game theory , complete information , matching (statistics) , non cooperative game , backward induction , strong reciprocity , simultaneous game , sequential game , screening game , computer science , mathematics , social psychology , psychology , statistics
We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availability of dominated direct punishing strategies and the probability of repeated interaction with the same partner. Contrary to the predictions of game theory, we find substantial support for cooperation under complete information even in various single-play treatments.