Open AccessBehavioral evolution and biocultural games: vertical cultural transmission.
Author(s) -
C. Scott Findlay,
Charles J. Lumsden,
Roger I. C. Hansell
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.011
H-Index - 771
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.86.2.568
Subject(s) - cultural transmission in animals , natural selection , mechanism (biology) , diversity (politics) , evolutionary biology , selection (genetic algorithm) , biological evolution , darwinism , sociocultural evolution , transmission (telecommunications) , cultural diversity , evolutionary game theory , ecology , biology , game theory , sociology , epistemology , computer science , mathematical economics , artificial intelligence , economics , anthropology , genetics , philosophy , telecommunications
We consider an evolutionary game model in which strategies are transmitted culturally from parents to offspring rather than inherited biologically. Our analysis yields two noteworthy results. First, biocultural games show a greater diversity of dynamical behaviors than their purely biological counterparts, including multiple fully polymorphic equilibria. Second, biocultural games on average exhibit greater equilibrium strategy diversity because of the countervailing influences of cultural transmission and natural selection. Therefore, knowledge of a strategy's influence on Darwinian fitness is not sufficient to infer the evolutionary consequences of biocultural games. Further, our results suggest that cultural transmission in the presence of natural selection may be an important mechanism maintaining behavioral diversity in natural populations.