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.-Chemical and biological warfare has been increasing in the news. There are numerous issues. Among these are research and development and especially open-air testing, Congressional appropriations, ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol, using tear gas in Vietnam, Presidential policy reviews, and the chemical-biological disarmament treaty recently proposed by the Soviets. All of us seek to prevent chemical or biological war. Some believe the best way to prevent the use of these so-called horror weapons is not to have the weapons. This argument is appealing in its simplicity. Rather than come to this conclusion in ignorance, we should understand the complexity of the problem. The issue I will discuss is whether to have a capability, whether to allocate resources to chemical and biological capabilities. We must recognize that these weapons and their cost would be in addition to, and not a substitute for, other weapons. While money enters into my analysis, it is not a major factor. We are talking about a dollar magnitude of only hundreds of millions of dollars annually. This is insignificant in an $80 billion Defense budget. On the other hand, these funds could instead be spent on other scientific or medical research, on welfare, or on housing. Ml\y objective today is, first, to describe a framework for analyzing whether to have chemical and biological capabilities. Second, by using that framework, to identify the key issues about which each of you must make a value judgment. When making those value judgments, you will be deciding for yourself whether the United States needs each of four kinds of chemical or biological capability. You must recognize that reasonable men may differ on these value judgments. I have tried to avoid advocating any one value judgment. My policy preference probably will show, but it need not distract you from the analysis. The framework has two elements. First, we must recognize our objectives. These are non-proliferation, deterrence, and limiting damage. We all benefit when few or no nations have these weapons. Failing that, we can seek to deter nations from using the weapons. Failing that, we can reduce our losses by preparing a defense. The analysis mainly uses the non-proliferation and deterrence objectives. The framework's second element is distinguishing among four kinds of chemical and biological capabilities, that is, between chemical and biological, and between lethal and incapacitating. The framework's underlying premise is examining the problem in parts. I will examine four kinds of chemical and biological capabilities. This will result in a more reasoned conclusion. There is a fifth kind of weapon, which I will not cover. Defoliants, a form of anti-plant weapon, are being used extensively in South Vietnam today, covering thousands of square miles each year. The analytical framework would still apply. I hope you will not find my bluntness too unpleasant. Chemical and biologi-

Political considerations and analysis of military requirements for chemical and biological weapons.