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Scope and verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Author(s) -
Frank von Hippel
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
aip conference proceedings
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Conference proceedings
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.177
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 1551-7616
pISSN - 0094-243X
DOI - 10.1063/1.4876470
Subject(s) - icon , oracle , citation , computer science , scope (computer science) , download , upload , information retrieval , fissile material , world wide web , physics , programming language , quantum mechanics , neutron
A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material - in practice highly-enriched uranium and separated plutonium - for weapons. It has been supported by strong majorities in the United Nations. After it comes into force, newly produced fissile materials could only be produced under international - most likely International Atomic Energy Agency - monitoring. Many non-weapon states argue that the treaty should also place under safeguards pre-existing stocks of fissile material in civilian use or declared excess for weapons so as to make nuclear-weapons reductions irreversible. This paper discusses the scope of the FMCT, the ability to detect clandestine production and verification challenges in the nuclear-weapons states.

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