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Asymmetric Information and the Automobile Loan Market
Author(s) -
Sumit Agarwal,
Brent W. Ambrose,
Souphala Chomsisengphet
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
palgrave macmillan us ebooks
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Book series
DOI - 10.1057/9780230608917_6
Subject(s) - business , debt , information asymmetry , loan , mortgage underwriting , profitability index , consumption (sociology) , interest rate , monetary economics , finance , financial system , economics , mortgage insurance , social science , casualty insurance , sociology , insurance policy
Information revelation can occur through a variety of mechanisms. For example, corporate finance research has established that a firm’s dividend policies provide investors with information about future growth prospects.1 In addition, research on residential mortgages indicates that borrowers reveal their expected tenure through their choice of mortgage contracts.2 As a result, lenders offer a menu of mortgage interest rate and point combinations in an effort to learn about borrower potential mobility.3 Similarly, lenders may anticipate how consumer debt will perform by observing the consumption choices that are being financed. With the proliferation of risk-based pricing in credit markets, lender’s ability to further differentiate between borrower credit risks, based on consumer choice of goods, offers lenders a potentially important source to enhance profitability, as well as the potential to extend credit to a wider range of borrowers.4

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