Fraud risk assessment within blockchain transactions
Author(s) -
Pierre-Olivier Goffard
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
advances in applied probability
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.69
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1475-6064
pISSN - 0001-8678
DOI - 10.1017/apr.2019.18
Subject(s) - database transaction , chain (unit) , computer security , business , block (permutation group theory) , blockchain , computer science , mathematics , combinatorics , database , physics , astronomy
The probability of successfully spending twice the same bitcoins is considered. A double-spending attack consists in issuing two transactions transferring the same bitcoins. The first transaction, from the fraudster to a merchant, is included in a block of the public chain. The second transaction, from the fraudster to himself, is recorded in a block that integrates a private chain, exact copy of the public chain up to substituting the fraudster-to-merchant transaction by the fraudster-to-fraudster transaction. The double-spending hack is completed once the private chain reaches the length of the public chain, in which case it replaces it. The growth of both chains are modelled by two independent counting processes. The probability distribution of the time at which the malicious chain catches up with the honest chain, or, equivalently, the time at which the two counting processes meet each other, is studied. The merchant is supposed to await the discovery of a given number of blocks after the one containing the transaction before delivering the goods. This grants a head start to the honest chain in the race against the dishonest chain.
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