Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences | Zendy

Fuad Aleskerov | Zendy; Daniel Karabekyan | Zendy; Alexander Ivanov | Zendy; Vyacheslav Yakuba | Zendy

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Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences

Author(s) -

Fuad Aleskerov,

Daniel Karabekyan,

Alexander Ivanov,

Vyacheslav Yakuba

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

procedia computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334

H-Index - 76

ISSN - 1877-0509

DOI - 10.1016/j.procs.2018.10.252

Subject(s) - computer science , degree (music) , mathematical optimization , mathematics , physics , acoustics

The degree of individual manipulability of majoritarian aggregation procedures is evaluated for the case of one-dimensional positioning of alternatives and agents. The calculation of the degree of manipulability is performed for 3-5 alternatives. We find that the group of rules dominates all others in terms of the lowest share of all manipulable profiles, and for some extensions gives even the zero level manipulability.

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