A Game-theoretic Approach for Channel Security Against Active Time-Varying attacks Based on Artificial Noise.

To penetrate sensitive communication systems, attackers can attack the channel using an Active Time-Varying(ATV) way, which will lead to a great information loss. The conventional approach is to encrypt the original signal making it difficult for attackers to get information. However, this technology is constrained by the limited wireless terminal equipment. In this paper, we choose to insert artificial noise into the channel, which aims at disturbing the attackers and reducing the loss of the system once attacks occur. However this technology has some side effects and tradeoffs. In this paper, we deal with this issue and propose a game-theoretic framework to minimize the total losses. We model the problem as a defender-attacker Stackelberg security game where the communication system plays a defender role. Furthermore we propose a novel binary search based algorithm to efficiently compute the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium which is the optimal defense strategy. This algorithm reduces a M-dimensional problem to M 1-dimensional problems so that the complexity is lowered. The experimental results show that our proposed algorithm significantly outperforms other non-strategic strategies in terms of decreasing the total losses against ATV attacks.