A Method for Revealing and Addressing Security Vulnerabilities in Cyber-physical Systems by Modeling Malicious Agent Interactions with Formal Verification
Author(s) -
Dean C. Wardell,
Robert F. Mills,
Gilbert L. Peterson,
Mark E. Oxley
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
procedia computer science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334
H-Index - 76
ISSN - 1877-0509
DOI - 10.1016/j.procs.2016.09.289
Subject(s) - computer science , computer security , industrial control system , cyber physical system , access control , focus (optics) , critical infrastructure , control (management) , operating system , physics , optics , artificial intelligence
everal cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical systems (CPS) that monitor and control critical infrastructure were publically announced over the last few years. Almost without exception, the proposed security solutions focus on preventing unauthorized access to the industrial control systems (ICS) at various levels – the defense in depth approach. While useful, it does not address the problem of making the systems more capable of responding to the malicious actions of an attacker once they have gained access to the system. The first step in making an ICS more resilient to an attacker is identifying the cyber security vulnerabilities the attacker can use during system design. This paper presents a method that reveals cyber security vulnerabilities in ICS through the formal modeling of the system and malicious agents. The inclusion of the malicious agent in the analysis of an existing systems identifies security vulnerabilities that are missed in traditional functional model checking
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