Arguing Security of Generic Avionic Mission Control Computer System (MCC) using Assurance Cases | Zendy

Bhanuchander Reddy Poreddy | Zendy; Steven Corns | Zendy

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Arguing Security of Generic Avionic Mission Control Computer System (MCC) using Assurance Cases

Author(s) -

Bhanuchander Reddy Poreddy,

Steven Corns

Publication year - 2011

Publication title -

procedia computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334

H-Index - 76

ISSN - 1877-0509

DOI - 10.1016/j.procs.2011.08.092

Subject(s) - avionics , computer science , software security assurance , information assurance , computer security , mandatory access control , security controls , argument (complex analysis) , quality assurance , control (management) , access control , information security , security service , operations management , artificial intelligence , engineering , aerospace engineering , biochemistry , chemistry , external quality assessment , role based access control

An assurance case is a body of evidence organized into an argument demonstrating that some claim about a system holds, i.e., is assured. Assurance cases are used to comment about system safety and it serves as a mean to show that the systems acceptably satisfy their safety properties. Assurance cases perform rigorous security analysis on safety-critical complex systems. In this paper, the analysis done is an approach to documenting an assurance case for system security, i.e., a security assurance case. The paper deals with the Assurance cases for Generic Avionic Mission Control Computer system, by constructing tangible claims and investigating potential vulnerabilities

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