Collusion-Resistant Reputation Mechanism for Multi-Agents Systems | Zendy

Babak Khosravifar | Zendy; Jamal Bentahar | Zendy; Mahsa Alishahi | Zendy; Maziar Gomrokchi | Zendy

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Collusion-Resistant Reputation Mechanism for Multi-Agents Systems

Author(s) -

Babak Khosravifar,

Jamal Bentahar,

Mahsa Alishahi,

Maziar Gomrokchi

Publication year - 2011

Publication title -

procedia computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.334

H-Index - 76

ISSN - 1877-0509

DOI - 10.1016/j.procs.2011.07.025

Subject(s) - collusion , reputation , computer science , nash equilibrium , stochastic game , strategic dominance , mechanism (biology) , best response , game theory , repeated game , service provider , mechanism design , microeconomics , computer security , service (business) , business , economics , marketing , social science , philosophy , epistemology , sociology

We address the collusion problem in a reputation-driven multi-agent system where agents represent service providers, consumers, and a controller. A game structure is proposed where players are supposed rational and payoff maximizers. The main issue addressed in this paper is how to maintain a collusion-resistant reputation mechanism. We analyze the behavior of different players with respect to the strategies adopted by the opponents. We provide theoretical analysis of the game and discuss the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium along with best response analysis to identify conditions under which the players adopt truthful dominant strategies

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