Static Validation of a Voting Protocol | Zendy

Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen | Zendy; Esben Heltoft Andersen | Zendy; Hanne Riis Nielson | Zendy

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Static Validation of a Voting Protocol

Author(s) -

Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen,

Esben Heltoft Andersen,

Hanne Riis Nielson

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

electronic notes in theoretical computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.242

H-Index - 60

ISSN - 1571-0661

DOI - 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.06.001

Subject(s) - computer science , protocol (science) , voting , blinding , extension (predicate logic) , process (computing) , static analysis , cryptographic protocol , electronic voting , computer security , theoretical computer science , programming language , cryptography , medline , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology , politics , political science , law

The desired security properties of electronic voting protocols include verifiability, accuracy, democracy and fairness. In this paper we use a static program analysis tool to validate these properties for one of the classical voting protocols under appropriate assumptions. The protocol is formalised in an extension of the LySa process calculus with blinding signatures. The analysis, which is fully automatic, pinpoints previously undiscovered flaws related to verifiability and accuracy and we suggest modifications of the protocol needed for validating these properties

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