Securing Statically-verified Communications Protocols Against Timing Attacks | Zendy

Mikael Buchholtz | Zendy; Stephen Gilmore | Zendy; Jane Hillston | Zendy; Flemming Nielson | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Securing Statically-verified Communications Protocols Against Timing Attacks

Author(s) -

Mikael Buchholtz,

Stephen Gilmore,

Jane Hillston,

Flemming Nielson

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

electronic notes in theoretical computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.242

H-Index - 60

ISSN - 1571-0661

DOI - 10.1016/j.entcs.2005.01.016

Subject(s) - computer science , encryption , protocol (science) , cryptographic protocol , compiler , communications protocol , process (computing) , process calculus , theoretical computer science , cryptography , computer network , computer security , programming language , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology

We present a federated analysis of communication protocols which considers both security properties and timing. These are not entirely independent observations of a protocol; by using timing observations of an executing protocol it is possible to calculate encryption keys which were intended to be secret or to deduce derived information about the nature of the communication even in the presence of unbreakable encryption. Our analysis is based on expressing the protocol as a high-level model and deriving from this process calculus models analysable by the Imperial PEPA Compiler and the LySatool

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research