Deciding the Security of Protocols with Commuting Public Key Encryption | Zendy

Yannick Chevalier | Zendy; Ralf Küsters | Zendy; Michaël Rusinowitch | Zendy; Mathieu Turuani | Zendy

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Deciding the Security of Protocols with Commuting Public Key Encryption

Author(s) -

Yannick Chevalier,

Ralf Küsters,

Michaël Rusinowitch,

Mathieu Turuani

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

electronic notes in theoretical computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.242

H-Index - 60

ISSN - 1571-0661

DOI - 10.1016/j.entcs.2004.05.019

Subject(s) - encryption , probabilistic encryption , multiple encryption , 40 bit encryption , computer science , 56 bit encryption , on the fly encryption , attribute based encryption , deterministic encryption , cryptographic primitive , filesystem level encryption , theoretical computer science , cryptographic protocol , computer security , plaintext aware encryption , cryptography , public key cryptography

Many cryptographic protocols and attacks on these protocols make use of the fact that the order in which encryption is performed does not affect the result of the encryption, i.e., encryption is commutative. However, most models for the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols can not handle such encryption functions since in these models the message space is considered a free term algebra. In this paper, we present an NP decision procedure for the insecurity of protocols that employ RSA encryption, which is one of the most important instances of commuting public key encryption

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