A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism | Zendy

Justin Tiehen | Zendy

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A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism

Author(s) -

Justin Tiehen

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

synthese

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

eISSN - 1573-0964

pISSN - 0039-7857

DOI - 10.1007/s11229-014-0505-3

Subject(s) - conceptualism , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy of language , metaphysics , epistemology , philosophy of mind , philosophy of science , character (mathematics) , philosophy , state (computer science) , computer science , mathematics , chemistry , biochemistry , geometry , algorithm

In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the “Two Visual Systems Hypothesis” notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner.

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