Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games | Zendy

Enrico Guzzini | Zendy; Antonio Palestrini | Zendy

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Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games

Author(s) -

Enrico Guzzini,

Antonio Palestrini

Publication year - 2010

Publication title -

european journal of law and economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.429

H-Index - 30

eISSN - 1572-9990

pISSN - 0929-1261

DOI - 10.1007/s10657-010-9178-7

Subject(s) - coase theorem , property rights , public finance , economics , order (exchange) , stochastic game , mathematical economics , law and economics , property (philosophy) , alienation , field (mathematics) , microeconomics , mathematics , political science , transaction cost , law , pure mathematics , finance , philosophy , epistemology , macroeconomics

In this paper we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the Coase theorem with respect to the final distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated field of research. In our framework, in order to reach efficiency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts (temporary or permanent). We show under our payoff conditions the role of binding contracts (permanent and temporary) in the final attribution of individual rights

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