Optimal Pricing of Court Services
Author(s) -
Neil Rickman,
Dionisia Tzavara
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
european journal of law and economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.429
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1572-9990
pISSN - 0929-1261
DOI - 10.1007/s10657-005-1013-1
Subject(s) - monopoly , equity (law) , public finance , unit (ring theory) , economics , set (abstract data type) , nonlinear pricing , commercial law , microeconomics , simple (philosophy) , variable pricing , business , actuarial science , computer science , macroeconomics , law , political science , mathematics , programming language , mathematics education , philosophy , epistemology
Litigants are generally charged for using court services. The charges involved are usually set to achieve a combination of efficiency, equity and funding goals. This paper presents a simple model, based on regulated monopoly pricing, to address the question of how these charges should be set. We find that fixed fees generally form part of the optimal charging package, despite concerns about their regressive nature. Per-unit fees will also be used though they may be set below cost; in this case, a trade-off emerges and the fixed fee is used to achieve funding goals. Our model is a useful one for developing extensions from the nonlinear pricing literature. © 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc
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