Agenda control in coalition formation | Zendy

Francis Bloch | Zendy; St x E phane Rottier | Zendy

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Agenda control in coalition formation

Author(s) -

Francis Bloch,

St x E phane Rottier

Publication year - 2002

Publication title -

social choice and welfare

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.504

H-Index - 52

eISSN - 1432-217X

pISSN - 0176-1714

DOI - 10.1007/s003550200155

Subject(s) - setter , government (linguistics) , economics , public finance , control (management) , bargaining power , international political economy , mathematical economics , state (computer science) , power (physics) , microeconomics , order (exchange) , simple (philosophy) , politics , political science , political economy , computer science , macroeconomics , management , law , history , philosophy , linguistics , physics , archaeology , finance , algorithm , quantum mechanics , epistemology

. Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules.

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