Open AccessA methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
Author(s) -
Éric Guerci,
Nobuyuki Hanaki,
Naoki Watanabe,
Gabriele Esposito,
Xiaoyan Lu
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
social choice and welfare
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.504
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1432-217X
pISSN - 0176-1714
DOI - 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y
Subject(s) - negotiation , protocol (science) , approval voting , voting , weighted voting , public finance , condorcet method , cardinal voting systems , mathematical economics , economics , statistics , econometrics , mathematics , political science , law , medicine , politics , alternative medicine , pathology
International audienceWe conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69-87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjectsmade less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA
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