The voter who wasn?t there: Referenda, representation and abstention
Author(s) -
Paulo P. C�rte-Real,
Paulo Trigo Pereira
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
social choice and welfare
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.504
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1432-217X
pISSN - 0176-1714
DOI - 10.1007/s00355-003-0219-9
Subject(s) - referendum , voting , preference , representation (politics) , mathematical economics , public finance , domain (mathematical analysis) , outcome (game theory) , focus (optics) , majority rule , anti plurality voting , bullet voting , economics , econometrics , cardinal voting systems , computer science , mathematics , microeconomics , political science , law , artificial intelligence , mathematical analysis , physics , optics , macroeconomics , politics
We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we formalize this concern and reach our main result: no voting rule can ensure representation if abstention is possible, unless restrictive assumptions are made on the preference domain of abstainers. We then focus on the main referendum systems and show that appropriate restrictions do make them compatible with representation. The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design: rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on the preference domain of non-voters, we recommend instead that a conscious choice be made on how abstention is to be interpreted and that this choice be used to derive the corresponding referendum rule.
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