Modular proofs for key exchange: rigorous optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model | Zendy

Yvonne Hitchcock | Zendy; Colin Boyd | Zendy; Juan Manuel González Nieto | Zendy

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Modular proofs for key exchange: rigorous optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model

Author(s) -

Yvonne Hitchcock,

Colin Boyd,

Juan Manuel González Nieto

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

applicable algebra in engineering communication and computing

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.558

H-Index - 35

eISSN - 1432-0622

pISSN - 0938-1279

DOI - 10.1007/s00200-005-0185-9

Subject(s) - mathematical proof , computer science , protocol (science) , identifier , modular design , set (abstract data type) , session (web analytics) , key (lock) , key exchange , theoretical computer science , computer network , computer security , mathematics , programming language , public key cryptography , world wide web , encryption , medicine , alternative medicine , geometry , pathology

Various optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model for secure protocol design are proven to preserve security. In particular it is shown that multiple authenticators may be safely used together; that certain message components generated by authenticators may be reordered (to be sent at a different time) or replaced with other values with certain precautions; and that protocols may be defined in the ideal world with session identifiers constructed during protocol runs. Consequently protocol designers now have a set of clear rules to optimize and customize their designs without fear of breaking the security proof. In order to obtain the required proofs, we find it necessary to slightly revise the authenticated links part of the Canetti–Krawczyk model.

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