Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection | Zendy

Meglena Jeleva | Zendy; Bertrand Villeneuve | Zendy

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Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

Author(s) -

Meglena Jeleva,

Bertrand Villeneuve

Publication year - 2003

Publication title -

economic theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.572

H-Index - 58

eISSN - 1432-0479

pISSN - 0938-2259

DOI - 10.1007/s00199-003-0396-x

Subject(s) - adverse selection , pooling , monopoly , public finance , actuarial science , economics , selection (genetic algorithm) , insurance policy , outcome (game theory) , microeconomics , mathematical economics , econometrics , computer science , artificial intelligence , macroeconomics

This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004Imprecise probabilities, Insurance markets, Adverse selection.,

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