On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies | Zendy

Dionysius Glycopantis | Zendy; Allan Muir | Zendy; Nicholas C. Yannelis | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies

Author(s) -

Dionysius Glycopantis,

Allan Muir,

Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication year - 2003

Publication title -

economic theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.572

H-Index - 58

eISSN - 1432-0479

pISSN - 0938-2259

DOI - 10.1007/s00199-002-0299-2

Subject(s) - core (optical fiber) , incentive compatibility , economics , bayesian game , context (archaeology) , public finance , private information retrieval , mathematical economics , construct (python library) , differential (mechanical device) , microeconomics , ex ante , incentive , sequence (biology) , mechanism design , information asymmetry , complete information , solution concept , differential game , sequential equilibrium , equilibrium selection , game theory , sequential game , repeated game , computer science , mathematical optimization , mathematics , macroeconomics , computer security , aerospace engineering , engineering , genetics , biology , telecommunications , paleontology , programming language

In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible. Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Differential information economy, Private core, Radner equilibrium, Rational expectations equilibrium, Weak fine core, Weak fine value, Free disposal, Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility, Game trees, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium, Contracts., JEL Classification Numbers: 020, 226.,

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research