Values and coalition configurations | Zendy

M. Josune Albizuri | Zendy; Juan Vidal-Puga | Zendy

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Values and coalition configurations

Author(s) -

M. Josune Albizuri,

Juan Vidal-Puga

Publication year - 2014

Publication title -

mathematical methods of operations research

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.524

H-Index - 48

eISSN - 1432-5217

pISSN - 1432-2994

DOI - 10.1007/s00186-014-0484-7

Subject(s) - shapley value , mathematical economics , game theory , disjoint sets , generalization , cooperative game theory , computer science , value (mathematics) , mathematics , combinatorics , mathematical analysis , machine learning

In this paper we consider coalition configurations (Albizuri et al. in Games Econ Behav 57:1–17, 2006), that is, families of coalitions not necessarily disjoint whose union is the grand coalition, and give a generalization of the Shapley value (Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953) and the Owen value (Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88, 1977) when coalition configurations form. This will be an alternative definition to the one given by Albizuri et al.

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