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A bankruptcy approach to the core cover
Author(s) -
Arantza Estévez-Fernández,
M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro,
Manuel A. Mosquera,
Estela Sánchez
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
mathematical methods of operations research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.524
H-Index - 48
eISSN - 1432-5217
pISSN - 1432-2994
DOI - 10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2
Subject(s) - compromise , bankruptcy , core (optical fiber) , cover (algebra) , computer science , set (abstract data type) , mathematical economics , game theory , mathematics , economics , law , engineering , finance , telecommunications , political science , programming language , mechanical engineering
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. © 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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