The simple geometry of perfect information games | Zendy

Stefano Demichelis | Zendy; Klaus Ritzberger | Zendy; Jeroen M. Swinkels | Zendy

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The simple geometry of perfect information games

Author(s) -

Stefano Demichelis,

Klaus Ritzberger,

Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

international journal of game theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.461

H-Index - 44

eISSN - 1432-1270

pISSN - 0020-7276

DOI - 10.1007/s001820400169

Subject(s) - contractible space , subgame perfect equilibrium , simple (philosophy) , trembling hand perfect equilibrium , nash equilibrium , mathematics , graph , subgame , mathematical economics , extensive form game , combinatorial game theory , best response , combinatorics , game theory , sequential game , epsilon equilibrium , philosophy , epistemology

Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games. (authors' abstract

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