On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria | Zendy

Robert F. Nau | Zendy; Sabrina G Canovas | Zendy; Pierre Hansen | Zendy

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On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria

Author(s) -

Robert F. Nau,

Sabrina G Canovas,

Pierre Hansen

Publication year - 2004

Publication title -

international journal of game theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.461

H-Index - 44

eISSN - 1432-1270

pISSN - 0020-7276

DOI - 10.1007/s001820300162

Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , polytope , epsilon equilibrium , correlated equilibrium , best response , mathematical economics , mathematics , boundary (topology) , risk dominance , combinatorics , convex polytope , symmetric equilibrium , regular polygon , convex geometry , equilibrium selection , game theory , convex set , geometry , repeated game , convex optimization , mathematical analysis

It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004C720,

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