Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes | Zendy

Naoki Watanabe | Zendy; Shigeo Muto | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Author(s) -

Naoki Watanabe,

Shigeo Muto

Publication year - 2008

Publication title -

international journal of game theory

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.461

H-Index - 44

eISSN - 1432-1270

pISSN - 0020-7276

DOI - 10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9

Subject(s) - oligopoly , core (optical fiber) , singleton , mathematical economics , profit (economics) , microeconomics , economics , revenue , game theory , set (abstract data type) , computer science , cournot competition , telecommunications , pregnancy , accounting , biology , programming language , genetics

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees’ total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor’s revenue is uniquely determined

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research