Open AccessA Full Proof of the BGW Protocol for Perfectly Secure Multiparty Computation
Author(s) -
Gilad Asharov,
Yehuda Lindell
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
journal of cryptology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.444
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1432-1378
pISSN - 0933-2790
DOI - 10.1007/s00145-015-9214-4
Subject(s) - adversary , protocol (science) , secure two party computation , computer science , computation , secure multi party computation , set (abstract data type) , theoretical computer science , multiplication (music) , provable security , commitment scheme , discrete mathematics , computer security , mathematics , cryptography , algorithm , combinatorics , programming language , medicine , alternative medicine , pathology
In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of n parties with private inputs wish to jointly compute some functionality of their inputs. One of the most fundamental results of secure computation was presented by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson (BGW) in 1988. They demonstrated that any n-party functionality can be computed with perfect security, in the private channels model. When the adversary is semi-honest, this holds as long as $$t
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