Naturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of hume's argument against miracles | Zendy

Catherine Legg | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Naturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of hume's argument against miracles

Author(s) -

Catherine Legg

Publication year - 2001

Publication title -

philosophia

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.301

H-Index - 20

eISSN - 1574-9274

pISSN - 0048-3893

DOI - 10.1007/bf02379782

Subject(s) - philosophy , wonder , naturalism , philosophy of mind , philosophy of science , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy of language , metaphysics , chemistry , biochemistry

How should we proceed when confronted with a phenomenon (or evidence which points towards a phenomenon) which baffles us? The term "miracle" is a convenient term on which to hang this question. It has a religious meaning, and the arguments I will be discussing are applicable to the case of deciding, for example, whether to believe in the Judaeo-Christian God, based on the reports of miracles offered by the Bible. However, one can generalise from this case to deeper issues about our attitude to the apparently inexplicable. By the apparently inexplicable I mean that which contradicts our most well-confirmed beliefs. This general question is the theme of this paper

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research