Open AccessLower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions
Author(s) -
Ehud Lehrer
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
international journal of game theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.461
H-Index - 44
eISSN - 1432-1270
pISSN - 0020-7276
DOI - 10.1007/bf01248496
Subject(s) - observable , repeated game , mathematical economics , symmetric game , equilibrium selection , set (abstract data type) , nash equilibrium , economics , mathematics , game theory , computer science , physics , programming language , quantum mechanics
We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.
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