Information Security Practice and Experience

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comPrivacy is a major concern in RFID systems, especially with\udwidespread deployment of wireless-enabled interconnected personal de-\udvices e.g. PDAs and mobile phones, credit cards, e-passports, even cloth-\uding and tires. An RFID authentication protocol should not only allow\uda legitimate reader to authenticate a tag but it should also protect the\udprivacy of the tag against unauthorized tracing: an adversary should not\udbe able to get any useful information about the tag for tracking or dis-\udcovering the tag's identity. In this paper, we analyze the privacy of some\udrecently proposed RFID authentication protocols (2006 and 2007) and\udshow attacks on them that compromise their privacy. Our attacks con-\udsider the simplest adversaries that do not corrupt nor open the tags. We\uddescribe our attacks against a general untraceability model; from expe-\udrience we view this endeavour as a good practice to keep in mind when\uddesigning and analyzing security protocols