Non-interactive Auction Scheme with Strong Privacy
Author(s) -
Kun Peng,
Colin Boyd,
Ed Dawson,
Kapali Viswanathan
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
lecture notes in computer science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Book series
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.249
H-Index - 400
eISSN - 1611-3349
pISSN - 0302-9743
ISBN - 3-540-00716-4
DOI - 10.1007/3-540-36552-4_28
Subject(s) - scheme (mathematics) , verifiable secret sharing , computer science , computer security , key (lock) , encryption , generalized second price auction , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , privacy protection , auction theory , common value auction , mathematics , microeconomics , economics , mathematical analysis , set (abstract data type) , programming language
Key chain, as an effective tool to achieve strong bid privacy non-interactively, was employed by Watanabe and Imai in an auction scheme. But in their scheme bid privacy cannot be achieved unconditionally and losing bidders must trust bidders with higher bids for privacy of their bids. Moreover, their scheme is not efficient. In this paper the key chain in the shceme by Watanabe and Imai is optimised to achieve unconditional bid privacy. In the new scheme, every losing bidder can control privacy of their own bids while no trust is needed. Computational cost of this scheme is optimised by avoiding the costly verifiable encryption technique in their scheme.
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