On the Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol | Zendy

Ian Goldberg | Zendy

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On the Security of the Tor Authentication Protocol

Author(s) -

Ian Goldberg

Publication year - 2006

Publication title -

lecture notes in computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Book series

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.249

H-Index - 400

eISSN - 1611-3349

pISSN - 0302-9743

ISBN - 3-540-68790-4

DOI - 10.1007/11957454_18

Subject(s) - computer science , random oracle , computer security , protocol (science) , authentication protocol , authentication (law) , cryptographic protocol , cryptography , the internet , oracle , anonymity , computer network , world wide web , public key cryptography , encryption , medicine , alternative medicine , software engineering , pathology

Tor is a popular anonymous Internet communication system, used by an estimated 250,000 users to anonymously exchange over five terabytes of data per day. The security of Tor depends on properly authenticating nodes to clients, but Tor uses a custom protocol, rather than an established one, to perform this authentication. In this paper, we provide a formal proof of security of this protocol, in the random oracle model, under reasonable cryptographic assumptions.

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