Cryptanalysis of a Forward Secure Blind Signature Scheme with Provable Security | Zendy

Shuhong Wang | Zendy; Feng Bao | Zendy; Robert H. Deng | Zendy

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Cryptanalysis of a Forward Secure Blind Signature Scheme with Provable Security

Author(s) -

Shuhong Wang,

Feng Bao,

Robert H. Deng

Publication year - 2005

Publication title -

lecture notes in computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Book series

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.249

H-Index - 400

eISSN - 1611-3349

pISSN - 0302-9743

ISBN - 3-540-30934-9

DOI - 10.1007/11602897_5

Subject(s) - random oracle , schnorr signature , blind signature , scheme (mathematics) , cryptanalysis , merkle signature scheme , computer science , signature (topology) , ring signature , computer security , elgamal signature scheme , provable security , public key cryptography , theoretical computer science , cryptography , mathematics , encryption , mathematical analysis , geometry

A forward secure blind signature scheme was proposed by Duc, Cheon and Kim, in ICICS 2003. The security of the scheme was proved to be equivalent to the strong RSA assumption in the random oracle model. In this paper we present an attack to the scheme by forging valid signatures with public keys only. The attack is so efficient that forging a valid signature needs less computation than legally generating a signature, even considering only the user side. Our result implies that the security proof of the scheme must be invalid. Furthermore we point out the fault of the proof and explain why it invalidates the proof

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