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Optimization of Electronic First-Bid Sealed-Bid Auction Based on Homomorphic Secret Sharing
Author(s) -
Kun Peng,
Colin Boyd,
Ed Dawson
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
lecture notes in computer science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Book series
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.249
H-Index - 400
eISSN - 1611-3349
pISSN - 0302-9743
ISBN - 3-540-28938-0
DOI - 10.1007/11554868_7
Subject(s) - computer science , correctness , secret sharing , computer security , unique bid auction , secure multi party computation , bid shading , homomorphic encryption , proxy bid , vickrey–clarke–groves auction , scheme (mathematics) , auction theory , algorithm , common value auction , cryptography , microeconomics , encryption , mathematics , mathematical analysis , economics
Although secret sharing techniques have been applied to implement secure electronic sealed-bid auction for a long time, problems and attacks still exist in secret-sharing-based electronic sealed-bid auction schemes. In this paper, a new secret-sharing-based first-bid e-auction scheme is designed to achieve satisfactory properties and efficiency. Correctness and fairness of the new auction are based on hard computation problems and do not depend on any trust. Complete bid privacy based on a threshold trust is achieved in the new scheme. Attacks to existing secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes are prevented.

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