Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems | Zendy

David C. Parkes | Zendy

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Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems

Author(s) -

David C. Parkes

Publication year - 2000

Publication title -

lecture notes in computer science

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Book series

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.249

H-Index - 400

eISSN - 1611-3349

pISSN - 0302-9743

DOI - 10.1007/10720026_11

Subject(s) - computer science , valuation (finance) , revenue , auction theory , mechanism design , incentive , deliberation , rational agent , microeconomics , operations research , business , common value auction , economics , artificial intelligence , engineering , accounting , finance , politics , political science , law

As traditional commerce moves on-line more business transactions will be mediated by software agents, and the ability of agentmediated electronic marketplaces to efficiently allocate resources will be highly dependent on the complexity of the decision problems that agents face; determined in part by the structure of the marketplace, resource characteristics, and the nature of agents" local problems. We compare auction performance for agents that have hard local problems, and uncertain values...

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