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Wealth and the principal–agent matching
Author(s) -
Fagandini Paulo
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.3402
Subject(s) - moral hazard , economic rent , limited liability , principal (computer security) , matching (statistics) , homogeneous , principal–agent problem , microeconomics , economics , business , finance , incentive , computer science , mathematics , computer security , statistics , combinatorics , corporate governance
I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal–agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Wealthier agents match with bigger firms, when talent is homogeneous among them, whereas for equally wealthy agents, more talented agents will match with bigger firms. I describe economic conditions over types such that pairs of higher types will write contracts in which the agent gets more than the limited liability rents. Finally, I write conditions on wealth for assortative matching in talent to hold.