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Optimal pricing and quality of academic journals and the ambiguous welfare effects of forced open access: A two‐sided model
Author(s) -
MuellerLanger Frank,
Watt Richard
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
managerial and decision economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.288
H-Index - 51
eISSN - 1099-1468
pISSN - 0143-6570
DOI - 10.1002/mde.3375
Subject(s) - monopolistic competition , quality (philosophy) , economics , microeconomics , welfare , audience measurement , open access journal , social welfare , business , advertising , political science , law , monopoly , market economy , philosophy , medline , epistemology , scopus
We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two‐sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to the previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high‐quality journals. Second, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profits, and may increase social welfare.