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As water distribution networks (WDNs) become increasingly connected withdigital infrastructures, they face greater exposure to cyberattacks thatthreaten their operational integrity. Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks(SFDIAs) are particularly concerning, as they manipulate sensor data tocompromise system operations while avoiding detection. While existing studieshave focused on either detection methods or specific attack formulations, therelationship between attack sophistication, system knowledge requirements, andachievable impact remains unexplored. This paper presents a systematic analysisof sensor attacks against WDNs, investigating different combinations ofphysical constraints, state monitoring requirements, and intrusion detectionevasion conditions. We propose several attack formulations that range fromtailored strategies satisfying both physical and detection constraints tosimpler measurement manipulations. The proposed attacks are simple and local --requiring knowledge only of targeted sensors and their hydraulic connections --making them scalable and practical. Through case studies on Net1 and Net3benchmark networks, we demonstrate how these attacks can persistently increaseoperational costs and alter water flows while remaining undetected bymonitoring systems for extended periods. The analysis provides utilities withinsights for vulnerability assessment and motivates the development ofprotection strategies that combine physical and statistical securitymechanisms.

Breaking the Flow and the Bank: Stealthy Cyberattacks on Water Network Hydraulics