Open AccessAttacking GlobalPlatform SCP02-compliant Smart Cards Using a Padding Oracle Attack
Author(s) -
Gildas Avoine,
Loïc Ferreira
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
iacr transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
ISSN - 2569-2925
DOI - 10.46586/tches.v2018.i2.149-170
Subject(s) - padding , computer science , computer security , smart card , adversary , oracle , plaintext , encryption , byte , computer network , operating system , software engineering
We describe in this paper how to perform a padding oracle attack against the GlobalPlatform SCP02 protocol. SCP02 is implemented in smart cards and used by transport companies, in the banking world and by mobile network operators (UICC/SIM cards). The attack allows an adversary to efficiently retrieve plaintext bytes from an encrypted data field. We provide results of our experiments done with 10 smart cards from six different card manufacturers, and show that, in our experimental setting, the attack is fully practical. Given that billions SIM cards are produced every year, the number of affected cards, although difficult to estimate, is potentially high. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful attack against SCP02.