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ONE of the most widely perceived characteristics of economic recovery since early 1975 has been the relatively slow growth of business fixed investment. At the end of 1978, for example, real GNP was 13.8 percent above the value attained at the cyclical peak five years earlier. By contrast, the performance of real nonresidential fixed investment has been poor. Its previous peak value, reached in the first quarter of 1974, was only surpassed in the second quarter of 1978. Even by the end of 1978, it was only 8.1 percent above the earlier peak. During the past five years, the apparent sluggishness of nonresidential fixed investment has generated pronouncements about the declining incentive to invest and warnings that investment performance must be improved to maintain the growth of real income and of the supply capacity needed to reduce inflationary pressure. For example, in a widely publicized speech in October 1977, Arthur Burns examined business fixed investment and found: "In the two-and-a-half years of this expansion, real capital outlays have increased only half as much as they did, on average, over like periods in the five previous expansions. The shortfall

Investment in the 1970s: Theory, Performance, and Prediction