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In the  Anthropology , Kant writes that both passions and affects impede reflection. However, he also holds that passions can be paired with reflection, while affects cannot. Stating that passions can both impede reflection and be paired with it seems to imply a contradiction. I seek to solve the problem by arguing that Kant is drawing on two notions of ‘reflection.’ The one kind of reflection consists in the ability to properly assess whether one should act from one’s affect or one’s passion in light of some normative standards. The other kind of reflection consists in the ability to explicitly endorse at least some of the more general maxims that underlie one’s maxim. In view of this distinction, I argue that the former kind is impeded by both passions and affects, while the latter kind is impeded by affects alone.

Kant on the Obstacles of Reflection: Affects, Passions and Maxims