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Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation amongself-interested agents is a central problem across social and biologicalsciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have anopportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggestthat cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experimental designs,however, is the fact that real-world human punishment -- the administration ofjustice -- is intrinsically noisy. Here we show that stochastic punishmentfalls short of sustaining cooperation in the repeated public good game. Aspunishment noise increases, we find that contributions decrease and punishmentefforts intensify, resulting in a $45\%$ drop in gains compared to a noiselesscontrol. Moreover, we observe that uncertainty causes a rise in antisocialpunishment, a mutually harmful behavior previously associated with societieswith a weak rule of law. Our approach brings to light challenges to cooperationthat cannot be explained by economic rationality and strengthens the case forfurther investigations of the effect of noise -- and not just bias -- on humanbehavior.

The cost of noise: stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in social dilemma experiments