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If profit maximization is the objective of a firm, new information about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects on market demand. I consider an alternate model in which suppliers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit. A simple model demonstrates the way in which performance data can alter both pecuniary incentives (i.e. extrinsic motivation) and incentives unrelated to profit (i.e. intrinsic motivation). The introduction of quality "report cards" for cardiac surgery in Pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to test for an effect of new information on quality (mortality) and to isolate the relative role of extrinsic (demand side) and intrinsic (supply side) incentives in determining surgeon response to new information. Using a structural demand system, I estimate the profit incentives facing each surgeon from the introduction of report cards. Extrinsic incentives due to quality reporting led to a .09 percentage point (three percent) decline in mortality. Consistent with a mixed model of objectives, information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated to patient demand led to an intrinsic response three times as large as surgeon response to profit incentives.

Information and Quality When Motivation is Intrinsic: Evidence from Surgeon Report Cards