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This paper presents a replay attack that can compromise the functionality of joint radar communication (JRC) systems that use orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) by creating ghost target signatures. The attack is particularly dangerous in connected autonomous vehicles that deploy JRC. When the attacker detects the OFDM JRC transmission it retransmits the same frame (preamble and data) but with a frequency and phase shift that varies across subcarriers and successive OFDM symbols of the preamble. This technique exploits the operation of the OFDM RADAR receiver algorithm and generates additional ghost targets in the Range-Doppler response at the JRC system. To evaluate the impact of this attack we calculate the Range-Doppler response for different system configurations of an 802.11-based OFDM JRC system and different spoofing strategies in a representative vehicular system. Our results show that JRC based on OFDM can easily be spoofed and it may lead to inability of a autonomous vehicular system to operate safely.

A Replay Attack Against Joint Radar Communication in Connected Vehicular Systems