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Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effectof information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protectagainst Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects stronglight into the QKD apparatuses, and then analyzes the back-reflected light tolearn information about their internal setting choices. Only a few recent worksconsider this security threat, but predict a rather poor performance of QKDunless the devices are strongly isolated from the channel. Here, we derivefinite-key security bounds for decoy-state-based QKD schemes in the presence ofTHAs, which significantly outperform previous analyses. Our results constitutean important step forward to closing the existing gap between theory andpractice in QKD.

Improved Finite-Key Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution Against Trojan-Horse Attacks