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The matching literature often recommends market centralization under theassumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferencesare fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. InGermany's university admissions, a clearinghouse implements the early stages ofthe Gale-Shapley algorithm in real time. We show that early offers made in thisdecentralized phase, although not more desirable, are accepted more often thanlater ones. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoreticalmodel, are consistent with students' costly learning about universities. Wepropose a hybrid mechanism to combine the advantages of decentralization andcentralization.  Published at The Journal of Political Economy under a new title, ``PreferenceDiscovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic MultiofferMechanisms,'' available at https://doi.org/10.1086/718983 (Open Access).

Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions